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Trust Center

How we handle your data

Putting a monitoring appliance on someone's network is a request for trust. This page is the specifics behind that request — what the node can reach, what leaves it, and what happens to the data on the way out. Written for the person doing your security review.

Credentials are redacted before anything leaves

Logs carry secrets more often than anyone intends — passwords in command lines, tokens in connection strings, bearer headers. The collector on the node redacts credential-shaped values before an event leaves your site, so they are never sent, let alone stored.

That is pattern-based redaction of credentials, not classification of regulated data. If your logs carry patient or cardholder data, tell us before deployment: what the node collects can be narrowed, and that is a scoping conversation rather than a setting.

The node watches; it cannot act

Intrusion detection reads a mirror port rather than sitting inline, so it cannot drop or alter your traffic. Nothing on the appliance has write access to your infrastructure — no firewall bouncer, no automated response, no configuration push.

Your telemetry is kept apart from every other client's by the tunnel it arrives on: the platform identifies a client by the node's tunnel address, which the node cannot change, and accepts nothing from an address it does not know.

Encrypted in transit, bounded at rest

Everything the node sends travels inside its WireGuard tunnel. It is stored in Cloudflare R2, encrypted at rest, for a period set by your agreement — by default 31 days of logs and 90 of metrics — and then deleted by the storage engine itself rather than by a cleanup job someone has to remember to run.

Nothing needs to be opened for us

The node dials out and accepts nothing from the internet. It needs zero inbound firewall rules — your perimeter policy stays exactly as it is, which is usually the difference between a deployment that gets approved and one that stalls in security review for a quarter. From your own network it accepts only what your devices send it: syslog, SNMP traps and, if you run them, Wazuh agents.

A key per appliance: Each node holds its own WireGuard key, issued centrally and never generated or shared on site, and the tunnel accepts traffic from it only at the one address assigned to it.
Isolation that is tested: Every deployment of the collection platform ends by trying to break client separation — forged writes, reads through the ingest path, one client's test data queried as another — and stops if any of it works.
Least privilege in containers: Every service runs with no-new-privileges, and only the sensors that capture packets hold capture capabilities. Databases are unreachable from your network: they sit on container networks with no route off the host, or listen on loopback.

The whitepaper goes a level deeper on transport, client separation, and runtime isolation — written for the person who has to sign off rather than the person who has to be sold.

Read the security whitepaper